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ABSTRACT	  Newell	  and	  Shanks’	  critical	  review	  considers	  only	  a	  very	  limited	  sense	  in	  which	  
mental	  processes	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  either	  conscious	  or	  unconscious	  and	  consequently	  
gives	  a	  misleading	  analysis	  of	  the	  role	  of	  consciousness	  in	  human	  information	  processing.	  
This	  commentary	  provides	  an	  expanded	  analysis	  of	  conscious	  processing	  that	  also	  reveals	  
the	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  mental	  processes	  are	  unconscious.	  	  
	  
According	  to	  Newell	  &	  Shanks,	  it	  now	  seems	  to	  be	  generally	  accepted	  that	  whether	  a	  
process	  is	  conscious	  should	  be	  operationally	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  whether	  one	  has	  reportable	  
knowledge	  of	  it.	  	  Consequently,	  in	  their	  critical	  review	  of	  unconscious	  processing,	  this	  is	  the	  
criterion	  that	  they	  apply.	  However,	  as	  I	  have	  noted	  in	  the	  pages	  of	  this	  journal	  and	  
elsewhere	  (c.f.	  Velmans,	  1991	  a,	  b,	  1993,	  1996,	  2009)	  the	  psychological	  and	  philosophical	  
literature	  often	  confounds	  three	  distinct	  senses	  in	  which	  a	  process	  might	  be	  said	  to	  be	  
conscious.	  It	  might	  be	  conscious:	  
	  
(a)	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  is	  conscious	  of	  the	  process	  
(b)	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  process	  is	  accompanied	  by	  consciousness	  (of	  its	  
results)	  and	  	  
(c)	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  consciousness	  enters	  into	  or	  causally	  influences	  the	  process.	  
	  
In	  these	  publications	  I	  have	  also	  considered	  how	  these	  different	  forms	  of	  ‘conscious	  
processing’	  apply	  to	  every	  stage	  of	  human	  information	  processing,	  although	  I	  only	  have	  space	  
in	  this	  brief	  commentary	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  few	  examples.	  Ask	  yourself	  what’s	  conscious	  about	  
“conscious	  verbal	  thought”.	  We	  do	  not	  have	  introspective	  access	  to	  how	  the	  preconscious	  
cognitive	  processes	  that	  enable	  thinking	  produce	  individual,	  conscious	  thoughts	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
“inner	  speech.”	  	  However,	  the	  content	  of	  such	  thoughts	  and	  the	  sequence	  in	  which	  they	  
appear	  does	  give	  some	  insight	  into	  the	  way	  the	  cognitive	  processes	  (of	  which	  they	  are	  
manifestations)	  operate	  over	  time	  in	  problem	  solving,	  thinking,	  planning	  and	  so	  on.	  
Consequently	  such	  cognitive	  processes	  are	  partly	  conscious	  in	  sense	  (a),	  but	  only	  in	  so	  far	  as	  
their	  detailed	  operation	  is	  made	  explicit	  in	  conscious	  thoughts,	  thereby	  becoming	  accessible	  to	  
introspection	  and	  consequent	  report.	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  being	  conscious	  in	  sense	  (a)	  is	  the	  
criterion	  that	  Newell	  &	  Shanks	  adopt.	  
	  
However,	  many	  psychological	  processes	  are	  conscious	  in	  sense	  (b),	  but	  not	  in	  sense	  (a)—that	  
is,	  we	  are	  not	  conscious	  of	  how	  the	  processes	  operate,	  but	  we	  are	  conscious	  of	  their	  results.	  	  
This	  applies	  to	  perception	  in	  all	  sense	  modalities.	  	  When	  consciously	  reading	  this	  sentence	  for	  
example	  you	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  printed	  text	  on	  the	  page,	  accompanied,	  perhaps,	  by	  inner	  
speech	  (phonemic	  imagery)	  and	  a	  feeling	  of	  understanding	  (or	  not),	  but	  you	  have	  no	  
introspective	  access	  to	  the	  processes	  which	  enable	  you	  to	  read.	  Nor	  does	  one	  have	  
introspective	  access	  to	  the	  details	  of	  most	  other	  forms	  of	  cognitive	  functioning,	  for	  example	  to	  
the	  detailed	  operations	  which	  enable	  “conscious”	  learning,	  remembering,	  engaging	  in	  
conversations	  with	  others	  and	  so	  on.	  
	  
Crucially,	  having	  an	  experience	  that	  gives	  some	  introspective	  access	  to	  a	  given	  process,	  or	  
having	  the	  results	  of	  that	  process	  manifest	  in	  an	  experience,	  says	  nothing	  about	  whether	  that	  
experience	  carries	  out	  or	  controls	  that	  process.	  	  That	  is,	  whether	  a	  process	  is	  “conscious”	  in	  
sense	  (a)	  or	  (b)	  needs	  to	  distinguished	  from	  whether	  it	  is	  conscious	  in	  sense	  (c).	  	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  
not	  easy	  to	  envisage	  how	  the	  experience	  that	  makes	  a	  process	  conscious	  in	  sense	  (a)	  or	  (b),	  
could	  make	  it	  conscious	  in	  sense	  (c).	  	  Consciousness	  of	  a	  physical	  process	  does	  not	  make	  
consciousness	  responsible	  for	  the	  operation	  of	  that	  process	  (watching	  paint	  dry	  does	  not	  
actually	  make	  it	  dry	  on	  the	  wall).	  	  So,	  how	  could	  consciousness	  of	  a	  mental	  process	  carry	  out	  
the	  functions	  of	  that	  process?	  Alternatively,	  if	  conscious	  experience	  results	  from	  a	  mental	  
process	  it	  arrives	  too	  late	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  functions	  of	  that	  process.	  For	  example,	  try	  reading	  
the	  following	  sentence	  and	  note	  what	  you	  experience:	  
	  
“If	  we	  don’t	  increase	  the	  dustmen’s	  wages,	  they	  will	  refuse	  to	  take	  the	  refuse.”	  	  
	  
Note	  that	  on	  its	  first	  occurrence	  in	  your	  phonemic	  imagery	  or	  “inner	  speech”,	  the	  word	  
“refuse”	  was	  (silently)	  pronounced	  with	  the	  stress	  on	  the	  second	  syllable	  (refuse)	  while	  on	  its	  
second	  occurrence	  the	  stress	  was	  on	  the	  first	  syllable	  (refuse).	  But	  how	  and	  when	  did	  this	  
allocation	  of	  stress	  patterns	  take	  place?	  Clearly,	  the	  syntactic	  and	  semantic	  analysis	  required	  to	  
determine	  the	  appropriate	  meanings	  of	  the	  word	  “refuse”	  must	  have	  taken	  place	  prior	  to	  the	  
allocation	  of	  the	  stress	  patterns;	  and	  this,	  in	  turn,	  must	  have	  taken	  place	  prior	  to	  the	  phonemic	  
images	  entering	  awareness.	  
	  
Note	  too,	  that	  while	  reading,	  one	  is	  not	  conscious	  of	  any	  of	  the	  visual	  processing	  or	  pattern	  
recognition	  that	  is	  required	  to	  identify	  individual	  words,	  or	  of	  any	  syntactic	  or	  semantic	  analysis	  
being	  applied	  to	  the	  sentence.	  Nor	  is	  one	  aware	  of	  the	  processing	  responsible	  for	  the	  resulting	  
inner	  speech	  (with	  the	  appropriate	  stress	  patterns	  on	  the	  word	  “refuse”).	  	  The	  same	  may	  be	  
said	  of	  the	  paragraph	  you	  are	  now	  reading,	  or	  of	  the	  entire	  text	  of	  this	  paper.	  You	  are	  
conscious	  of	  what	  is	  written,	  but	  not	  conscious	  of	  the	  complex	  input	  analyses	  involved.	  	  And	  if	  
you	  are	  not	  conscious	  of	  how	  these	  processes	  operate,	  in	  what	  sense	  can	  they	  be	  said	  to	  be	  
under	  “conscious	  control”?	  	  
	  
The	  same	  may	  also	  be	  said	  about	  the	  detailed	  operation	  of	  nearly	  every	  other	  form	  of	  
human	  information	  processing	  (see	  reviews	  cited	  above).	  According	  to	  Newell	  &	  Shanks,	  
“evidence	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  robust	  unconscious	  influences	  on	  decision	  making	  and	  related	  
behaviors	  is	  weak,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  key	  research	  findings	  either	  demonstrate	  directly	  that	  
behavior	  is	  under	  conscious	  control	  or	  can	  be	  plausibly	  explained	  without	  recourse	  to	  
unconscious	  influences”(p	  19).	  On	  the	  contrary,	  evidence	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  unconscious	  
mental	  processes	  on	  human	  behaviour	  is	  ubiquitous.	  Indeed,	  if	  these	  complex	  processes	  
were	  conscious	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  Newman	  &	  Shanks	  intend,	  they	  should	  be	  directly	  available	  
to	  first-­‐person	  introspection,	  in	  which	  case	  there	  would	  be	  no	  need	  to	  discover	  their	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